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KATSURAJIMA Nobuhiro*
1	 Popular	Nationalism
 The process of dissolution of “early modern empire” in East Asia and the 
formation of popular nationalism is situated between the end of the eigh-
teenth and the end of the nineteenth centuries.1 Needless to say, the direct 
cause of this transformation was the eastern advance of world capitalism (the 
world=economics), but first, I will briefly summarize popular nationalism.2 In 
general, popular nationalism is a limited sense of belonging to a community 
imagined by the ancients as seen in texts. This sense of belonging is imag-
ined to have been true for all of the people in the nation since ancient times; 
it could be said to constitute a fabrication in the temporal phase of the 
modern era. Ethnicity and ethnic consciousness are nothing but products of 
this process. The root of that sense of belonging lies in imagined linguistic, 
consanguineous, and cultural (emotional) communities. Nevertheless, despite 
the fact that analysis of the documents bequeathed to us by the ancients 
elucidates the imagined sense of belonging of only a small number of 
ancients, the impact of such texts extends into the modern era, and their 
authors are imagined as “peoples (ethnic groups) who existed historically.” 
  * Ritsumeikan University
 1 See my “Kinsei teikoku no kaitai to 19 seiki zenhanki no shisō dōkō” 
(Dissolution of Kinsei teikoku and Philosophical Trends in the Early Part of the 
Nineteenth Century” 『近世帝国』の解体と 19世紀前半期の思想動向 in Nihon 
shisōshi kōza 3 (Lectures on Japanese Intellectual History 3) 日本思想史講座
3 (Perikanshaぺりかん社, 2012).
 2 For information on popular nationalism I referred to the 2007 NTT Shuppan 
Japanese translation by Shiraishi Saya白石さや of Benedict Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(originally published in 1983); Kang Sang-jung姜尚中, Nashonarizumu 
(Nationalism) ナショナリズム (Iwanami Shoten岩波書店, 2001); and Ōsawa 
Masachi大澤真幸, Nashonarizumu no yūrai (Origins of Nationalism) ナショナ
リズムの由来 (Kōdansha講談社, 2007).
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These are imagined as self-evident. Of course, the print revolution and spread 
of vernacular language, as well as the role of the military, should not be 
discounted, but as Benedict Anderson postulates, a definitive role in the 
formulation of people’s nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe was played 
by “editors of vernacular dictionaries, grammarians, linguists, and scholars of 
literature” in the formulation of an academic system for scholarship on 
ethnicity. This was an important moment in the fabrication of popular nation-
alism (imagination) globally in the twentieth century. Accordingly, popular 
nationalism became axiomatic during a long process that spanned some 
hundred years between the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the twen-
tieth centuries. Ultimately, popular nationalism can be construed as becoming 
embedded in popular consciousness as the result of the paradigm in which 
imperialism constituted wars of aggression; schools, modern scholarship; and 
languages, national languages.
2	 Formation	of	Popular	Nationalism	in	Tokugawa	Japan
 The first occurrence of popular nationalism in Tokugawa Japan could be 
considered the formation of modern National Learning as represented by 
Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801).3 Tracing nationalism back to its origins, the 
first set of issues in modern National Learning after the debate on Japanese 
uta 歌 poetry and morality (Kokka hachiron), was the question of what new 
significance was to be attributed to the uta and classical Chinese poetry, which 
existed as class culture and ceremonies that transcended national boundaries, 
and in which people of various social strata were beginning to participate.4 
Kada no Arimaro荷田在満 (1706–1751) understood the concept as poetry for 
sport (ganka翫歌 or tawamure戯れ), while Tayasu Munetake田安宗武 (1715–
1771) attempted to explain the issue using Zhu Xi-style moral prescriptions. 
The early period of the debate between Arimaro and Munetake was merely a 
demonstration of how contemporaneous uta were redefined, which was a 
continuation of questioning of the origins of uta and Chinese poetry divested 
of class culture, as well as its place in the culture of their day.5 Their cogni-
tion of the vicissitudes of uta in relation to those of classical Chinese poetry 
and their interpretations had more commonalities than differences. That is, it 
can be said that they and uta existed in an early modern imperial community.
 3 Katsurajima Nobuhiro桂島宣弘, Jita ninshiki no shisōshi (Intellectual History 
of Cognition of the Self and Others) 自他認識の思想史 (Yūshisha有志舎, 
2008).
 4 Usami Kisohachi宇佐美喜三八, Kinsei karon no kenkyū (Study of Early Modern 
Theories of Japanese Poetry) 近世歌論の研究 (Izumi Shoten和泉書院, 1987).
 5 Toki Zenmaru土岐善麿, Zōtei Kokka hachiron (Enlarged and Revised Edition 
of Kokka hachiron) 増訂国歌八論 (Kaizōsha改造社, 1943).
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 Motoori Norinaga, however, published a commentary to Kokka hachiron 
that circulated among the intelligentsia and at the same time brought forward 
a new debate centered on issues of “Yamato kotoba” (native Japanese words) 
and the community of emotion. Prior to this was Kamo no Mabuchi’s賀茂真
淵 (1697–1769) praise of uta (poetry) in kamiyo 神代 (the age of the gods) and 
especially of the nature uta 歌 selected from the Manyōshū, which he consid-
ered the essence of uta. Mabuchi claimed that the “spirit of the age of the 
gods”6 could be known through “uta,” and by extension, the “way of the 
gods” could also be known through what is “attained in nature.”7 Moreover, 
Mabuchi’s emphasis on a “return to an ancient” natural, gentle “age of the 
gods” was equivalent to “restoration.” There is a tendency to interpret resto-
ration as a pre-modern historical consciousness rooted in a historical view of 
decline, but here Japan in the age of the gods is linked to Mabuchi’s present 
(Tokugawa Japan). The focus must be on a temporally and successively 
completed interior that gives rise to thought. The philosophy of restoration in 
National Learning (as distinct from the philosophy of restoration found in 
Confucianism) gives rise to an imagined “historical Japan” through the struc-
ture in which the current era is reflected via the age of the gods. In his Goikō 
語意考 and Kokuikō国意考Mabuchi conceptualized this as “the country where 
the sun rises.” He extolled the fifty sounds of Japanese, the language of the 
“age of the gods,” and criticized the country of the Tang (China).
 It is noticeable that Motoori Norinaga’s imagined “imperial nation’s 
(Japan’s) language of the age of the gods” goes a step beyond Mabuchi’s. In 
Kokuikō, Mabuchi also states that “one can know the spirit and language of 
the age of the gods through uta from the age of the gods, and through that 
means, can understand the gods themselves.” He advocated a method for 
elucidating “the way of the world of the gods” through the “language of the 
age of the gods.” Yet in Goikō, Mabuchi understood the “sounds” in the 
language of the age of the gods to be “the natural sounds of heaven and 
earth” and did not change his stance that depended upon “nature.” Thus, the 
“language of the gods” in Mabuchi can be found in “nature.” Here vestiges of 
pre-Mabuchi early modern imperial thought can be seen. Motoori contrasted 
Chinese poetry, which “only expresses an unsettling rationalism,” with 
Japan’s “imperial” uta through which the “emotions and language of the age 
 6 I have used suitable modern translations for historical materials and quoted 
sections. Same below.
 7 I used the versions of the Niimanabi 邇飛麻那微, Goikō 語意考, and Kokuikō 
国意考 in the 19-volume Kamo no Mabuchi zenshū (Collected Works of Kamo 
no Mabuchi) 賀茂真淵全集 (Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kankōkai続群書類従刊行会, 
1980).
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of the gods” via the “elegant spirit and language of the age of the gods” 
constitute the “disposition of the country of the gods.”8
 While relying on this “spirit and language of the age of the gods,” Motoori 
put forward a “difference” in languages fabricated in ancient times, thereby 
interpreting “the largely different” “state of language” as the core of commu-
nality. That is, “the separation between the interior and exterior in all things 
is of the utmost importance.” The difference arising from “Japan as the inte-
rior and China as the exterior” (in Karaosame no ureta migoto 馭戎慨言) is 
clearly fabricated in “the language of the age of the gods,” signifying a 
homogeneity of “the empire of Japan” from the “state of the language” inter-
preted as having absolutely no compatibility. At the end of the eighteenth 
century, Motoori’s statement naturally was not yet a discourse that had 
acquired self-evidence. The role of modern scholarship was of definitive 
importance for the assertions by Motoori and others to become cultural 
literacy among the populace; indeed, a time span of over a century was 
necessary. It was the “discovery” of the work of Motoori and the Kojiki古事
記 and Manyōshū万葉集 through modern Japan’s popular nationalism that 
made the discourse become a truism.9
 Such assertions of National Learning arose in the peripheral “early modern 
empire,” Tokugawa Japan, where Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism took 
root the latest of all. It could be said that the consolidated systematic and 
social Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism in Qing China and Joseon Korea 
were never amenable to popular nationalism. But it is not our place to eval-
uate the phenomenon positively or negatively. Rather, what must be scruti-
nized is the unequal rise of popular nationalisms within the “early modern 
empires” of East Asia. Eventually, this inequality strikingly damaged and 
impaired East Asian cooperation and unity.
3	 Modern	Japanese	Scholarship	and	East	Asia:	China
 It is said that prior to Muraoka Tsunetsugu村岡典嗣 (1884–1946), Motoori 
was not considered a particularly important intellectual in Tokugawa Japan.10 
 8 I used the versions of Iso no kami no sesame goto 石上私淑言 and Karaosame 
no ureta migoto 馭戎慨言 in the Motoori Norinaga zenshū 本居宣長全集, Vols. 
2 and 8 (Chikuma Shobo筑摩書房, 1965–1993).
 9 Koyasu Nobukuni子安宣邦, “Norinaga mondai” to wa nanika (What Is the 
Norinaga Problem? 「宣長問題」とは何か (Chikuma Shobo筑摩書房, 2000); 
Shinada Yoshikazu 品田悦一 Manyōshū no hatsumei (Discovery of the 
Manyōshū) 万葉集の発明 (Shinyōsha新曜社, 2001).
10 Maeda Tsutomu前田勉, “Kaisetsu: Nihon shisōshigaku no tanjō” (Birth of 
Japanese Intellectual History: Commentary) 解説 ― 日本思想史学の生誕 in 
Muraoka Tsunetsugu村岡典嗣, Shinhen Nihon shisōshi kenkyū (New Edition: 
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Even if there is no focus on Motoori, however, it must be said that modern 
Japanese scholarship, from its origin as successor to Motoori, and above all, 
national Japanese history, which is an inseparable part of nationalism, theo-
rized Asia—especially China—expressly as the “other” for self-representa-
tion. That is, where national history was recorded and its qualities narrated, 
“things not of Japan,” or “the source of Japan,” as well as “things without 
common qualities” or “things with common qualities” assumed East Asia, and 
in particular, China, as the main actor in the background. Of course, the long 
shadow of Western Orientalism influenced the notion that East Asia (China) 
is “the other.” In this sense, it is thought that it was the opposing position 
toward “contempt” by the West toward East Asia and China that invited such 
a structure. Inoue Tetsujirō井上哲次郎 (1856–1944), who is considered one of 
the individuals who established national Japanese history and Japanese intel-
lectual history, stated: “When Japanese walk down Western streets…they are 
despised as Chinese. Being called a Chinese can be considered a slur.” He 
plainly states that “in order to clarify the level of progress achieved by 
Japan,” which differs from that of China, “it is imperative that we Japanese 
research historiography and disclose to Europe Japan’s history so that they 
might know about it in Europe.” Herein clearly lies “the value of Oriental 
history.”11 Inoue eventually wrote the trilogy known as Nihon Yōmeigakuha 
no tetsugaku日本陽明学派之哲学 (Philosophy of Japan’s Wangyang Ming 
School; 1900), Nihon kogakuha no tetsugaku日本古学派之哲学 (Philosophy of 
Japan’s School of Ancient Learning, 1902), and Nihon Shushigakuha no 
tetsugaku日本朱子学派之哲学 (Philosophy of Japan’s Neo-Confucian School, 
1905), which I will discuss below. Of course, these works were composed in 
order to “clarify the level of progress achieved by Japan.”
 There is, however, an even more essential background for the necessity 
of Japanese intellectual history to make China “an inescapable other” from 
the beginning in order to attain a self-representation that was coincidental 
with (and deeply related to) such counter Orientalism. Most works considered 
to be examples of National Learning (including works understood as mani-
festing “pure” Japanese philosophy such as the Kojiki and Manyōshū) were 
written in classical Chinese script (regardless of whether they were written in 
classical Chinese漢文 or in Manyō-kana万葉仮名) or were written directly in 
the language of Confucianism or Buddhism (that place over there: China) 
Even in this sense, it must be said that for the writing of Japanese intellectual 
Research on Japanese Intellectual History) 新編日本思想史研究 (Heibonsha 
Tōyō Bunko平凡社東洋文庫, 2004).
11 Shigakkai zasshi 史学会雑誌,Vol. 24, 1891. In Inoue Tetsujirō shū井上鉄次郎集, 
Vol. 9 (Kuresu Shuppanクレス出版, 2003).
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history, Chinese script, and China, which came to be recognized as the birth-
place of Chinese characters in the modern era, was from the beginning liter-
ally an “inescapable” entity for self-representation.12 What Motoori did earlier 
was to extirpate Chinese characters (kana-ji, 仮字) as the language of an “alien 
land.” He stated that through the removal of kana-ji he wanted to secure the 
truism of “the imperial country,” which foreshadows the experience of 
Japanese intellectual history in the modern period a priori.
 Conversely, the fact that China could never be the “other” for Confucian 
intellectuals in Tokugawa Japan within the paradigm of “early modern 
empire” should not be overlooked. Looking solely at works on intellectual 
history, the Confucian history texts most representative of the Tokugawa era, 
Shinbun genryū斯文源流, written by Kakuguchi Seisei 河口静斎 (1703–1754) 
in 1750, and Naba Rodō’s那波魯堂 (1727–1789) Gakumon genryū 学問源流 
(1794), for example, reflect pithily on the conduct of Confucianists after 
Fujiwara Seika藤原惺窩 (1561–1619) from the following perspective seen in 
Shinbun genryū: “How can I possibly say that Confucianism, the canon of 
heaven and earth, is my own discourse? Adhering to personal theories and 
disdaining the saints and previous scholars is something small-minded people 
do.”13
 Gakumon genryū similarly describes the history of Confucianism, focusing 
on the period after Fujiwara Seika. In particular, Naba Rodō devotes many 
pages to the schools of Confucianism of Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斎 (1627–1705), 
Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728), and Yamazaki Ansai山崎闇斎 (1619–
1682). He criticizes their extreme theories and advocates instead a proper 
Neo-Confucianist stance.14 What is of most importance here is that none of 
12 For information on China as “the inescapable other” I have relied heavily on 
Koyasu Nobukuni子安宣邦, Kanji-ron漢字論 (Iwanami Shoten岩波書店, 2003). 
Koyasu subsequently has continued poignantly dissecting modern Japan (espe-
cially “Showa Japan”) and the “China problem.” I learned much from him for 
my discussion points here from his texts, “Ajia” wa dō katararete kita ka「ア
ジア」はどう語られてきたか (Fujiwara Shoten 藤原書店, 2003) and Nihonjin wa 
Chūgoku o dō kattate kita ka日本人は中国をどう語ってきたか (Seidosha青土
社, 2012), etc. In contrast, Korea has continued to be suppressed owing to its 
self-image. “China, which is always mentioned, and Korea, which is 
obscured,” could be said to be important issues for examining the structure of 
Japan’s self-image even today (as well as its own referenced scholarship), but 
here I must leave the “Korean problem” aside. Koyasu Nobukuni has also 
made keen observations on the “Korean problem” and narratives of national 
origins in Edo no shisō 江戸の思想,Vol. 4, 1996.
13 In Kinko bungei onchi sōsho 近古文芸温知叢書, Vol. 3 (Hakubunkan博文館, 
1891).
14 In Nihon bunko日本文庫, Vol. 6 (Hakubunkan博文館, 1891).
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the texts on intellectual history or the history of Confucianism in the 
Tokugawa era attempted to narrate histories of Japan or Japanese thought. 
There is mention of the differences between “them and us,” as in: “The 
Koreans have Korean customs and Ryūkyū and Japan have Ryūkyūan and 
Japanese customs; such phraseology is unavoidable. The poetry by Qing 
Chinese has Qing Chinese expressions.” Naba’s main point was not to cali-
brate the singularity of each, but while recognizing divergence in era and 
place, to advocate “that of course the keystone of the truth of Confucianism 
could not be achieved without compositions and poetry, or without a truthful 
and honest heart.” The “compositions and poetry” that Naba refers to were 
naturally written in classical Chinese. While acknowledging the “Japanese 
harmony in poetry recitations” 和気和習 (waki washū ), the Gakumon genryū 
concludes that by striving for sincerity誠 (makoto) it should be possible to 
arrive at the values common to China and Japan by excluding that “Japanese 
harmony in poetry recitations.” In other words, China and Japan were 
perceived to share a unified world and era (“empire”).
 Accordingly, the otherization of China, premised on the dissolution of the 
“early modern empire” and severance of the imperial bond, was an inevitable 
structure based on the creation (fabrication) of Japan’s self-image harking 
back to the beginning of the ancient era. These primordial structures were 
acknowledged by Motoori, as mentioned above, but can be considered prob-
lems encountered immediately at the point that Fukuzawa Yukichi福沢諭吉 
(1835–1901) wrote Bunmei-ron no gairyaku文明論之概略 (1875) and Taguchi 
Ukichi田口卯吉 (1855–1905) wrote Nihon kaika shōshi日本開化小史 (1877–
1882). It is common knowledge that Bunmei-ron no gairyaku presented China 
as the opposite extreme  when it asserted that “Western civilization was the 
goal,” but Nihon kaika shōshi also vividly narrates the same structure of 
tracing the civilization of Japan as a process whereby “what should be 
conveyed about ancient writing in our country today is that it actually began 
with classical Chinese,” and from there, that “we write using Japanese 
grammar.”
4	 Japanese	Intellectual	History	and	China
 Next I will examine how Japan and China were described at the end of 
the Meiji period, considered the beginning of Japanese intellectual history. 
First I will discuss the text Nihon Sōgakushi日本宋学史 (1909) by Nishimura 
Tenshū (1865–1924). Of course, Nishimura became prominent as the chief 
editor of the Osaka Asahi shinbun 大阪朝日新聞. Here the issue under review 
is that he was already a scholar of Chinese classics who was aware of 
modern scholarship (and not a Confucianist). Nishimura states in the preface 
of the Nihon Sōgakushi:
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 The foundation of the ethics of our Japanese citizens derives from our 
intrinsic virtues since the age of the gods, influence of Confucianism 
that arrived in Japan during the reign of Emperor Ōjin, and promulga-
tion of Buddhism that began in the reign of Emperor Kinmei (509–571). 
These three factors were forged in one “bellows.”… Confucianism and 
Buddhism worked together and contributed greatly to improvement in 
ethics and development of the liberal arts. It must be said that it is this 
that makes our national polity different from that of China. With our 
unbroken line of emperors, and unique virtues from the age of the 
gods—which is as eternal as heaven and earth—as our essence, we have 
achieved a comprehensive assimilation of both Confucianism and 
Buddhism. Thus, Confucianism has become Japanese Confucianism, and 
Buddhism has become Japanese Buddhism. All three have become fused 
into one, and have cultivated the Japanese spirit and the way of the 
warrior (bushidō).15
 Here the account in the Nihon Sōgakushi from the end of the Meiji period 
describes thoroughly the kinds of perspectives and possibilities there were. 
Nishimura traces the establishment of “unique virtues,” and interaction with 
the two “foreign philosophies” of Confucianism and Buddhism as a history of 
“harmony” and “comprehensive assimilation,” the result of which was that 
“Japanese Confucianism,” “Japanese Buddhism,” the Japanese spirit,” “the 
way of the warrior,” and ultimately, “popular ethics” arose. That is, in 
Japanese intellectual history, the “unique value” of Japanese philosophy could 
be found by stripping away all “foreign thought.” The notion of “comprehen-
sive assimilation” of the “foreign philosophies” of Confucian and Buddhist 
thought to those “unique values” was itself Japanese philosophy. On the other 
hand, he had a strong awareness of the source of such philosophy, China, in 
which, unlike the “harmony” of Japanese Confucianism and Buddhism, “the 
essence of Confucianism was the expulsion of heresy,” and “Buddhism 
labeled Confucianism and Daoism as heterodoxies, so that these mutual accu-
sations have been made for a very long time.”
 I would like to elaborate a little more on how such theories formed the 
described framework (proprieties) of Japanese intellectual history at the time. 
15 Published in 1909 by Ryōkōdo Shoten梁江堂書店, pp. 1–8. For information on 
Nishimura Tenshū 西村天囚, see: Godaiin Yoshimasa後醍院良正 (Original and 
Supplement) “Wakakihi no Tenshū”「（正・続）若き日の天囚」in Kaitoku懐徳, 
Vols. 36 and 37, 1968–1969; Umetani Noboru梅溪昇, Osaka gakumonshi no 
shūhen大阪学問史の周辺 (Shibunkaku Shuppan思文閣出版, 1991); Machida 
Saburō 町田三郎, Meiji no Kangakusha tachi 明治の漢学者たち (Kenbun 
Shuppan研文出版, 1998), etc.
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Haga Yaiichi’s芳賀矢一 (1867–1927) Kokuminsei jūron国民性十論 (1907) 
became the forerunner of Nihonjinron (theories of Japanese identity) against 
the backdrop of Japan’s leap into imperial status after the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904–1905). In Kokuminsei jūron, Haga states:
Our country was influenced from early times by Chinese culture, and 
took in Indian civilization through China. Furthermore, while the coun-
tries of the Orient today all atrophy, only our nation has entered the 
league of world powers. Recently, the effects of importing Western civi-
lization have become strikingly notable. In what way was our country’s 
culture influenced by the civilizations of India and China? To what 
extent did the people of our country absorb them and develop them-
selves? At the same time that we reflect on our happiness today, we must 
take serious precautions about our future. We must know the past to plan 
well for the future.16
Haga states plainly that “only our nation has entered the league of world 
powers” after the Russo-Japanese War, which is “our happiness today,” and 
that to understand that process, the task should be assigned of learning how 
Japan was influenced by “Indian and Chinese civilizations,” and how Japan 
“absorbed and developed them.” When we examine Haga’s ten “national 
traits” today, they certainly appear to be listed arbitrarily, but it must be noted 
that his references reflect a constant cognizance of the West and comparison 
with China. Examples include his statement that “Chinese also observe 
ancestor worship, but in revolutionary countries such as China, it is meaning-
less to link this attribute to the nation.” Here “ancestor worship” is consid-
ered a Japanese “national trait.”
 The trilogy by Inoue Tetsujirō井上哲次郎mentioned earlier is perhaps the 
first comprehensive treatment of Tokugawa intellectual history. Comprised of 
Nihon Yōmeigakuha no tetsugaku, Nihon kogakuha no tetsugaku, and Nihon 
Shushigakuha no tetsugaku, the trilogy contains the following such state-
ments:
As expounded by Nakae Tojū中江藤樹 (1608–1648), the ancient sages 
had a “Japanese spirit imbued with Chinese learning;” they analyzed the 
Chinese classics with a Japanese spirit, and without being consumed by 
the Chinese classics, our countrymen took the standpoints they should 
take, and resolutely established [Japanese philosophy]….Tojū empha-
sized filial piety the most among the various virtues. We should take 
16 Fuzanbō hyakka bunko 8 Nihonjinron冨山房百科文庫⑧日本人論 (Fuzanbō 冨
山房, 1977), p. 128.
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note of this point. Filial piety was the code of ethics of ancestor worship 
(Ahnenkultus). Wherever filial piety is found, ancestor worship is always 
present….Filial piety links ancestors and descendants; the fate of blood 
ties depends on the strength of the state of filial piety. The Japanese race, 
however, descends from one distant ancient tradition, and has never been 
thrown into confusion by other races since the founding of our country; 
we have formed one great blood-line and built a one-family nation 
because we have a homogenous language, manners, customs, and 
history….It is for this reason that the cult of filial piety has an important 
relationship with the destiny of the Japanese race. In particular, filial 
piety in Japan is the loyalty that is inside oneself. Because the nation of 
Japan is formed from one family system, just as one is filial to the father 
of the family, he is filial to the sovereign of the country.17
 Nakae Tojū offers an evaluation from the viewpoint that they “analyzed 
the Chinese classics with a Japanese spirit, and without being consumed by 
the Chinese classics,” and in particular portrays them as the embodiment of a 
“filial piety” that is the “code of ethics of ancestor worship” with an “impor-
tant relationship with the destiny of the Japanese race.” In addition, in Nihon 
kogakuha no tetsugaku the “activism” “unique to the Japanese race” is under-
stood as being advocated through the Confucianists of the Kogaku School古
学派 (School of Ancient Learning). For example, Yamaga Sokō’s山鹿素行 
(1662–1685) “theory of the nation” is praised; his “theory of the morality of 
the samurai” also examines critically Nitobe Inazo’s新渡戸稲造 (1862–1933) 
Bushidō: The Soul of Japan, and evaluates the “constitution” of bushidō, the 
“spirit of which continues in the minds of the masses.” He regards Itō 
Jinsai’s “activism” “not as negativism,” but as the “manifestation of the 
nature of the Japanese race” “that innately requires active development.” 
Further, in Nihon Shushigakuha no tetsugaku, Neo-Confucianism is ranked as 
“our own system of education during the three-hundred years of the 
Tokugawa, which has influenced greatly the development of national ethics.” 
Through these volumes, the process of the unique development of 
Neo-Confucianism in Japan and the process of its convergence into a national 
ethical theory is portrayed. The eras are divided into three periods; the first 
two are described as a preparatory period for Neo-Confucianism to take root 
in Japan from its flowering under Fujiwara Seika to the Kansei Edict 寛政異
学禁 of 1790, which banned all forms of Confucianism except Neo-
17 Fuzanbō 冨山房, 1900, pp. 155–156. Subsequent quotes are from first editions 
of Nihon kogakuha no tetsugaku日本古学派之哲学 and Nihon Shushiha no 
tetsugaku日本朱子学派之哲学, which were all published by Fuzanbō Press.
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Confucianism. The third period is described thusly: “Even when direction was 
lost during the encounter with the tempestuous period of the Meiji 
Restoration, there was an eternal, indestructible truth in the ethical theory.” 
Here, too, references are accompanied with declarations such as: 
“Confucianism is something that was produced together and was intoned by 
the Chinese intelligentsia as ethical education beginning with Confucius.” 
“The people who came afterwards should have developed it even further, but 
they did not develop it very much. Among the Confucianists in Japan, 
Yamaga Sokō, Itō Jinsai, and Ogyū Sorai were such people, but none of the 
later people did anything.”
 As is clear above, whatever the content, the uniqueness of Japanese 
philosophy is assumed. Theories dealing with the development of Japanese 
philosophy, such as the manner of acceptance of the “two religions of 
Confucianism and Buddhism” stipulated as culture from abroad, “can be seen 
in Japan’s own cultural homogeneity.” It is possible to see how theories that 
understood the development of Japanese thought through interaction (inclu-
sion, assimilation) with such foreign cultures arose as expressly modern 
academic knowledge. A surgical operation was performed on all Japanese 
thought until the end of the Tokugawa period using the two scalpels of 
uniqueness and difference. As an operation to extract Japan subjectively from 
East Asia and China, the process prescribed the “proprieties” of Japanese 
intellectual history.
 Of course, if all self-expression is the product of the expression of the 
other, it is perhaps natural that the desire for self-expression inevitably 
accompanies such a structure or “proprieties.” Nevertheless, the fact that the 
East Asia (early modern empire), and China that were formerly within are still 
understood with an extremely ambivalent feeling indicates that they must at 
the very least be functioning to shake the very foundations of the Japanese 
self-image. In that sense, Japanese popular nationalism and East Asia/China 
share a profound and inescapable relationship even today. In order to disen-
tangle that relationship and create transnational scholarship, a means to face 
popular nationalism itself deconstructively must be sought.
